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NOTES

THE ROLE OF THE AVOIDANCE CANON
IN THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF ITS INCONSISTENT
APPLICATION IN THE COURT’S
DECISIONS
INTRODUCTION
Many have praised Chief Justice Roberts and the Roberts Court for
its judicial minimalism,1 and have noted the Roberts Court’s tendency
to shape constitutional law at a gradual pace.2 One of the tools the
Roberts Court has used to achieve this result is the avoidance canon,
which dictates that a court should “adopt one of several plausible
interpretations of a statute to avoid deciding a tough constitutional
question.”3 The Roberts Court has invoked this doctrine in many of
1 See, e.g., Hans Bader, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB: Narrow Separation-of-Powers
Ruling Illustrates That the Supreme Court Is Not “Pro-Business”, 2010 C ATO SUP. C T. R EV.
269, 269 (“Chief Justice John Roberts has often been depicted as an advocate of narrow rulings
and a judicial philosophy of minimalism.”); Randall T. Adams, Note, Recent Development:
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
R EV. 135, 135 (2010) (noting a canon of decisions by the Roberts Court “that might be fairly
characterized as ‘minimalist’”).
2 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the
Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. C T. R EV. 181, 223 (“If the agenda of the Roberts Court is major
change in constitutional law, the calculation may be that medicine usually goes down more
palatably when in small doses.”); Robert Barnes, Roberts Court Moves Right, But with a
Measured Step, WASH . POST , Apr. 20, 2007, at A3 (noting that the Court will move in gradual
shifts, “rather than by declaring bold breaks with the past”).
3 Hasen, supra note 2, at 181–182.
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its decisions, including in high-profile decisions such as Northwest
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder
(“NAMUDNO”).4 During the October 2009 term, however, the
Court’s decisions in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission5
and Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board6 tested the minimalist reputation of the Roberts Court when it
decided the constitutionality of the statutes at issue in both cases
rather than employing the avoidance canon. Richard Hasen has
labeled the practice whereby “the Court . . . eschew[s] a plausible
statutory interpretation to decide a difficult constitutional question” as
“anti-avoidance.”7 These three recent decisions show that, while it
may be that traditionally “few doctrines are more familiar and
predictable than the Supreme Court’s practice of avoiding decision of
constitutional questions,”8 the Roberts Court’s use of the avoidance
canon has been anything but consistent.
This Note seeks to explain the Roberts Court’s application of the
avoidance canon and to understand how these decisions affect the
validity and legitimacy of the avoidance canon and of the Court itself.
Part I gives context to the avoidance canon by examining the canon’s
history, its justifications, and its criticisms. Part II looks at the role of
the avoidance canon in three of the Court’s opinions. Part II.A
assesses NAMUDNO and the implausible statutory interpretation the
Court adopted to avoid deciding the constitutionality of section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. After discussing NAMUDNO, this
Note will turn to cases where the Court decided the constitutionality
of a statute rather than using the avoidance canon. In particular, Part
II.B discusses Citizens United and the Court’s decision to order reargument of the case as well as its subsequent decision to overrule
precedent. Part II.B also focuses on the interplay between Chief
Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion and Justice Stevens’s dissent.
Part II.C assesses Free Enterprise Fund and the majority’s decision to
read a for-cause removal requirement into the statute governing the
removal of SEC Commissioners in order to hold that the SarbanesOxley Act’s “dual” for-cause limitation contravened separation of
powers. Finally, Part III concludes that it is impossible to reconcile
the Court’s different approaches to the canon and argues that the

129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009).
130 S. Ct. 876, 889 (2010).
6 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010).
7 Hasen, supra note 2, at 182.
8 James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of Legal Dreams: A Communitarian Defense of
Judicial Restraint, 71 N.C. L. R EV. 805, 809 (1993).
4
5

2/14/2012 5:00:34 PM

2012]

THE ROLE OF THE AVOIDANCE CANON

847

inconsistent application of the avoidance canon has damaged the
doctrine itself and has put its own legitimacy in jeopardy.
I.

BACKGROUND ON THE AVOIDANCE CANON
A. History of the Canon and Its Evolution

The avoidance canon is a substantive canon. While many legal
scholars have traced its history to before Marbury v. Madison,9 the
standard citation for the canon is Justice Brandeis’ concurring opinion
in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.10 In Ashwander, Justice
Brandeis summarized seven rules that the Court had implemented in
“passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed
upon it for decision”11:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation in a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding . . .
2. The Court will not ‘anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.’ . . .
3. The Court will not ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to
be applied.’
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. . . .
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. . . .
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its
benefits.
9 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85
GEO. L.J. 1945, 1948 n.13 (1997) (noting that the Court invoked a version of the avoidance
canon in Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800)).
10 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Brandeis’s explanation of the
canon has been called “the most significant formulation of the avoidance doctrine.” Lisa A.
Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. R EV. 1003, 1012 (1994).
11 Id. at 346.
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7. ‘When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principal that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided.12
From these seven rules, Adrian Vermeule extracted three major
categories of avoidance.13 The first category is “procedural
avoidance,” which suggests that “courts should order the issues for
adjudication, or the rules that determine the forum in which a case
should proceed, with an eye to obviating the need to render
constitutional rulings on the merits.”14 The second category is
“classical avoidance,” and the third category is “modern avoidance.”15
The last two categories are different from procedural avoidance in
that they affect the judicial construction of a statute.16 The “classical
avoidance” approach directs that “‘as between two possible
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be
unconstitutional and by the other valid, [the Court’s] plain duty is to
adopt that which will save the Act.”’17 In contrast, the “modern
avoidance” approach provides that “where an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems,
the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”18 The
major difference between classical and modern avoidance, therefore,
“is in the level of constitutional concern needed to trigger the rule”
since modern avoidance allows “serious but potentially unavailing
constitutional objections to dictate statutory meaning.”19 It is
important to keep in mind that, even though the Court has claimed
that constitutional avoidance has been applied for so long that its use
is beyond debate, many scholars have questioned the reasons for its
use.20
Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346–48 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
See Vermeule, supra note 9, at 1948–49 (describing the three categories).
14 Id. at 1948.
15 Id. at 1949.
16 Id. at 1949. (describing the difference between the two types of avoidance).
17 Id. (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring)
(alteration in original)).
18 Id. (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
19 Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 C OLUM .
L. R EV. 1189, 1203 (2006).
20 See Lawrence C. Marshall, Divesting the Courts: Breaking the Judicial Monopoly on
Constitutional Interpretation, 66 C HI.-KENT L. R EV . 481, 484 (1990) (“[I]t is worthwhile to
consider how well the canon reflects actual congressional awareness of constitutional issues and
what kind of constitutional culture it helps create within the halls of Congress.”).
12
13
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B. Justification for and Criticisms of the Avoidance Canon
1. Justifications for the Canon
Many scholars have emphasized different justifications for the
avoidance canon and have long debated its usefulness in
constitutional law.21 While the justifications for the canon are often
stated differently, the main arguments in favor of its use are the
promotion of federalism and the separation of powers, the limitations
of the judiciary, and the importance of constitutional adjudication.22
In contrast, critics of the canon emphasize that modern avoidance can
actually conflict with legislative intent and that the canon often does
not prevent the unnecessary creation of constitutional law.23
The first justification for the avoidance canon is that the courts
should avoid unnecessary questions to maintain the integrity of
federalism and the separation of powers. Therefore, “to the extent
Congress or a state is charged with authority in a particular
substantive area, courts should carefully ensure the ability of these
actors to interpret the Constitution in their work by not foreclosing
options.”24 Essentially, this argument for the canon is that courts
should respect, rather than invalidate, another branches’ constitutional
determination.25
The second justification for the avoidance canon is that it is
necessary due to the limitations of the judiciary and the perceived
fragility of its legitimacy. Justice Brandeis wrote his concurrence in
Ashwander as a response to the judicial activism of the Court of the
Lochner era, and his opinion reflected contemporary fears that the
Court’s credibility was at stake.26 The canon insulates the Court from
21 Compare Brian C. Murchison, Interpretation and Independence: How Judges Use the
Avoidance Canon in Separation of Powers Cases, 30 GA. L. R EV. 85, 94 (1995) (arguing that
the avoidance canon “provides a framework for staking judicial ground and exercising
independent judgment in complex encounters with precedent and the balance of politics”), with
Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Does Avoiding Constitutional Questions Promote Judicial
Independence?, 56 C ASE W. R ES. L. R EV. 1031, 1036 (2006) [hereinafter Judicial
Independence?] (noting that “[t]he costs of avoiding constitutional questions are borne too often
by the poor and marginalized in our society, those most in need of help securing protections for
their constitutional rights and civil liberties”).
22 See Kloppenberg, supra note 10, at 1035–54 (analyzing six justifications for the
doctrine).
23 See Morrison, supra note 19, at 1209–10 (highlighting the two most common criticisms
of the canon).
24 Judicial Independence?, supra note 21, at 1033.
25 See id. (“Judicial review that invalidates another [branch’s] constitutional work should
be a last resort . . . .”).
26 See id. at 1033–34 (noting that “[t]he Ashwander formulation arose in part as a response
to the activism of the . . . Supreme Court of the Lochner era” and that the fears associated with
this “animate the general avoidance doctrine . . . ”).
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Brandeis’ concerns by enabling “the judiciary to render unpopular
decisions cautiously, rather than suddenly or haphazardly, [which]
preserves judicial credibility and increases public acceptance of Court
decisions.”27
The final justification for the avoidance canon is the “paramount
importance of constitutional adjudication in our system.”28 This
concept relies on the perception that the Court’s ability to decide
constitutional rights may be the Court’s biggest responsibility and
most important power.29 Constitutional adjudication is central and
crucial to the judiciary because, when a court decides a statutory or
procedural issue, the result may have an effect on a large number of
individuals or on the operations of an administrative agency.30
While many scholars have examined the justifications for the
rules, Richard Hasen came up with three theories that draw on these
justifications to explain why a Court will decide to invoke
constitutional avoidance. The three theories are the “fruitful
dialogue,” “political legitimacy,” and “political calculus” theories.31
As Hasen notes, it is impossible to know which of these theories is
correct, and it is possible that more than one theory may come in to
play in any given case.32 Nevertheless, these explanations are helpful
to provide some framework to understand when and why the Court
invokes constitutional avoidance.
The fruitful dialogue rationalization “posits that the Court will use
constitutional avoidance only when doing so would further a dialogue
with Congress that has a realistic chance of actually avoiding
constitutional problems through redrafting.”33 This assumes that if the
Court avoids deciding the constitutionality of a statute, then it should
be a signal for Congress to fix that statute.34 Hasen’s second
explanation, the political legitimacy theory, posits that when the
Court fears that a constitutional decision would harm its legitimacy, it
will use the avoidance canon to maintain that legitimacy.35 This
explanation seems to come in to play most frequently when the issue

Kloppenberg, supra note 10, at 1044.
Id. at 1046 (quoting Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
29 See id. (“The Court sometimes claims that the ability to declare constitutional rights is
the most important power the federal judiciary wields.”).
30 See id. (“[M]any individual rights depend on administrative and statutory claims.”).
31 See Hasen, supra note 2, at 183–84 (explaining the three theories).
32 Id. at 184.
33 Id. at 183.
34 See id. (“On this reading, [a statute gets] ‘remanded’ to Congress because Congress
may fix it in ways that do not violate the Constitution . . . .”).
35 Id.
27
28
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at hand is controversial, such as abortion or race relations.36 The third
and final explanation is the political calculus theory, which
hypothesizes that the Court will use constitutional avoidance “to
soften public and Congressional resistance to the Court’s movement
of the law in a direction that the Court prefers as a matter of policy.” 37
According to this theory, the Court is able to lay the groundwork for a
constitutional pronouncement by invoking the avoidance canon and
then use its power to decide when is it is appropriate to make the
constitutional decision.38
2. Criticisms of the Canon
Even though constitutional avoidance is a widely-accepted canon,
it is not without its critics. One of the main criticisms of the canon is
that modern avoidance frequently conflicts with the intent of
Congress.39 Courts often think about and approach constitutional
questions in a very different way than Congress.40 When a court
decides to avoid a constitutional question, it often interprets the
statute “in ways that its drafters did not anticipate, and, constitutional
questions aside, in ways that its drafters may not have preferred.”41
Lawrence Marshall indicates that the extreme version of this criticism
occurs when a court ignores the plain language of the statute and
legislative intent to avoid a constitutional issue.42 Therefore, for those
who believe that the federal judiciary should interpret Congress’s
intent whenever possible, the canon can be extremely problematic
because of the leeway courts take with statutory interpretation when
invoking it.43
The second criticism of the avoidance canon is that it does not
prevent the unnecessary creation of constitutional law; instead, it can
lead to the over enforcement of the Constitution.44 Judge Richard
Posner, a major critic of the doctrine, contends that avoidance creates
36 See id. (referring to cases in which the Court used the avoidance canon to avoid
controversial issues involving race relations).
37 Id. at 183–84.
38 See id. at 184 (applying the political calculus theory to NAMUDNO and Citizens
United).
39 See Morrison, supra note 19, at 1209 (identifying two criticisms of modern avoidance).
40 See Marshall, supra note 20, at 489 (noting the difference in values between Congress
and the Court).
41 Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 S UP . C T . R EV . 71, 74.
42 Marshall, supra note 20, at 484.
43 See id. at 486 (“If one believes that the judiciary’s role . . . is to implement Congress’
constitutionally valid choices . . . then the specter of superconstitutional bending of statutes is
quite problematic.”).
44 See Morrison, supra note 19, at 1210 (continuing the discussion of the two criticisms of
modern avoidance).
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a “judge-made constitutional ‘penumbra’ that basically has the same
‘prohibitory effect’” as the Constitution.45 Other critics point out that
when a court uses the avoidance canon, it engages in the
constitutional issue “enough to supplant its otherwise preferred
construction of the statute.”46 Basically, a court that wants to avoid a
constitutional question has to (1) consider the argument to decide if it
should avoid and (2) ignore the interpretation of the statute that is
probably correct, which is almost akin to finding that interpretation of
the statute unconstitutional.47 Therefore, “[t]he fact that another,
different version of the statute survives does not change the reality
that, in the form that the court would otherwise have applied it in that
case, the statute has effectively been held invalid.”48 This can lead to
the distortion of legislative intent in more cases than it would if the
Court just decided all of the constitutional questions in every case.49
It is important to keep in mind that when a court invokes the
avoidance canon, it only avoids “some or all of the constitutional
questions argued” and does not avoid “all decision on the merits of
the case.”50 The Court, however, “has not invoked the avoidance
doctrine consistently. It alternatively employs—or ignores—
avoidance to achieve particular substantive outcomes.”51 The Roberts
Court is not immune from this criticism. The Roberts Court has
mentioned the avoidance canon in thirteen cases from January 2006
to June 2009.52 Additionally, the Court’s use of anti-avoidance in
Citizens United53 and Free Enterprise Fund54 has brought the canon
to the forefront of discussion once again. Regardless of whether one
thinks the avoidance canon should have a role in the Court’s decision
making, the fact is that the Court invokes it frequently and that its use
signals a Court that is looking to shape law and policy.55
45 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation – In the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. C HI. L. R EV. 800, 816 (1983).
46 Morrison, supra note 19, at 1210.
47 See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of Judiciary Review, 78 TEX. L. R EV . 1549, 1582 (2000) (identifying the two
components of avoidance).
48 Id.
49 See Morrison, supra note 19, at 1210 (“[C]ourts applying the canon actually over
enforce the Constitution.”).
50 Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the ‘Passive Virtues’—A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 C OLUM . L. R EV. 1, 16 (1964).
51 LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD
CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 1 (2001).
52 Hasen, supra note 2, at 192.
53 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917–19 (2010) (Roberts, J., concurring); id. at
936–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3184 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
55 See Hasen, supra note 2, at 189 (“[T]here seems to be consensus that the canon’s use
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THE ROBERTS COURT’S APPROACH TO THE AVOIDANCE CANON
IN NAMUDNO, CITIZENS UNITED, AND FREE ENTERPRISE FUND

The Roberts Court’s decisions in NAMUDNO, Citizens United,
and Free Enterprise Fund represent three distinct approaches to the
avoidance canon and illustrate three different views on the role it
should play in the Court’s jurisprudence. In NAMUDNO, the Court
enthusiastically invoked the canon and avoided deciding the
constitutionality of the controversial section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act (“VRA”).56 However, even though the Court claimed that
avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions was its “usual
practice”57 in NAMUDNO, the majority declined to invoke the canon
in Citizens United.58 Instead, despite the dissent’s insistence to the
contrary,59 the majority held that the case could not be decided on
narrow statutory grounds and proceeded to strike down the statute and
to overrule two of its previous decisions.60 Similarly, the Court did
not employ the avoidance canon in Free Enterprise Fund, but took
yet another approach to constitutional avoidance. Even though the
only reference to the canon was in Justice Breyer’s dissent,61 the
structure of the Court’s opinion and its interpretation of the statute
suggest that it ignored the canon and struck down the statute at issue
to avoid overruling Humphrey’s Executor v. United States62 and
Morrison v. Olson.63
signals a Court that is actively engaged in shaping law and policy, not acting modestly.”).
56 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508 (2009)
(noting that the Court’s “usual practice is to avoid the unnecessary resolution of constitutional
questions” and thus the Court “[did] not reach the constitutionality of [section] 5”).
57 Id.
58 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 892 (“Though it is true that the Court should construe
statutes as necessary to avoid constitutional questions, the series of steps suggested would be
difficult to take in view of the language of the statute.”).
59 See id. at 936–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is all the more distressing that our
colleagues have manufactured a facial challenge, because the parties have advanced numerous
ways to resolve the case that would facilitate electioneering by nonprofit advocacy corporations
such as Citizens United, without toppling statutes and precedents.”).
60 Id. at 913 (majority opinion).
61 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3184 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court then, by assumption, reads into the statute books a ‘for
cause removal’ phrase that does not appear in the relevant statute and which Congress probably
did not intend to write. And it does so in order to strike down, not to uphold, another statute.
This is not a statutory construction that seeks to avoid a constitutional question, but its
opposite.”).
62 295 U.S. 602, 631 (1935) (holding that “[w]hether the power of the President to remove
an officer shall prevail over the authority of Congress to condition the power by fixing a definite
term and precluding a removal except for cause, will depend upon the character of the
office . . .”).
63 487 U.S. 654, 670–77 (1988) (upholding the Independent Counsel Act as
constitutional).
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A. Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder
1. History of the Voting Rights Act
Section 5 of the VRA,64 the statute at issue in NAMUDNO, is
considered one of the most effective pieces of civil rights
legislation.65 Section 5 was enacted under the Fifteenth Amendment,
which guarantees that the “right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”66
Expounding on this idea, the VRA seeks to ensure that “[n]o voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of
the right of any citizen of the United State to vote on account of race
or color . . . .”67
Section 5 of the VRA requires “covered jurisdictions” to get
preclearance from the Attorney General or a declaratory judgment
from a three-judge district court in Washington, D.C., before they can
change any aspect of their voting practices, procedures, or
qualifications.68 The covered jurisdictions under the VRA are the
parts of the country that have a history of voter discrimination,69 since
the overall purpose of section 5 is “to prevent state and local
governments with a history of discrimination against racial minorities
from changing their voting rules without first proving that such
changes would have neither a discriminatory purpose nor effect.”70 To
obtain preclearance, the covered jurisdiction must show that the
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
See Barbara Arnwine, Voting Rights at a Crossroads: Return to the Past or an
Opportunity for the Future?, 29 SEATTLE U. L. R EV . 301, 308 (2005) (quotations and citations
omitted) (“Indeed, during the reauthorization hearings of 1982, Congress hailed the Voting
Rights Act as one of the most important civil rights bills passed by Congress and recognized it
as the most effective tool to protect the right to vote.”).
66 U.S. C ONST . amend. XV, § 1.
67 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).
68 See id. § 1973c (2006) (providing that jurisdictions who wish to enact a “voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting” may seek a declaratory judgment “that such qualification
. . . neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote . . .”).
69 See id. § 1973b(b):
64
65

The [VRA’s prohibition on voting tests or devices] shall apply to any State or in any
political subdivision of a State which . . . maintained on November 1, 1964, any test
or device, and with respect to which . . . the Director of the Census determines that
less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing therein were registered
on November 1, 1964, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the
presidential election of November 1964.
70

Hasen, supra note 2, at 196.
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purpose of the change is nondiscriminatory and that it will not
“diminish[] the ability of any citizens . . . to elect their preferred
candidates . . . ” on account of their race.71 Although section 5 is
broad, there is a seldom-used “bailout” provision found in section
4(a) for states and “political subdivisions” seeking exemption from
the preclearance requirement.72 Section 14(c)(2) of the VRA defines a
political subdivision as a parish, county, or “any subdivision of a
State which conducts registration for voting.”73 The question of
whether section 14(c)(2)’s limited definition of a political subdivision
applied to section 4(a)’s bailout provision was the crux of the Court’s
decision in NAMUDNO.74
Sections 4 and 5 of the VRA were supposed to be temporary
provisions and were expected to be in effect for only five years when
Congress passed the VRA.75 Congress reauthorized the VRA,
however, for five years in 1970, for seven years in 1975, and for
twenty-five years in 1982. In 2006, Congress passed the Fannie Lou
Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, which extended
section 5’s coverage for another twenty-five years.76 Although the
VRA has been the topic of a lot of litigation, politically it has not
been in jeopardy.77 The 2006 extension of the VRA passed the House
of Representatives by a vote of 390-33 with nine abstentions and
passed the Senate by a vote of 98-0 with two abstentions.78 Given the
politically-sensitive nature of the VRA and Congress’s lack of an
incentive to take a close look at the intricacies of the legislation, it
“did not change the coverage formula that determines which
jurisdictions must engage in preclearance,” nor did it “consider ways

71 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b) (2006); see also Hasen, supra note 2, at 195–96 (footnote
omitted) (“Section 5 of the VRA requires that ‘covered jurisdictions’ obtain preclearance . . .
before making any changes in voting practices . . . . For each one, the covered jurisdiction must
demonstrate that the change . . . will not make the affected minority groups worse off.”).
72 Id. § 1973b(a)(1) (2006) (describing the process required to receive a bailout).
73 Id. § 1973l(c)(2).
74 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513–16 (2009)
(discussing the definition of “political subdivision” under section14(c)(2) and holding that it
does not apply to the term “political subdivision” in section 4(a)).
75 Id. at 2510 (“As enacted, [sections] 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act were temporary
provisions. They were expected to be in effect for only five years.”).
76 Id. (“Most recently, in 2006, Congress extended [section] 5 for yet another 25 years.”).
77 See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 (1980) (affirming the
District Court’s rejection of city’s challenge to the 1982 renewal of the preclearance provision
of the VRA); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (contesting whether
Congress had “exercised its powers under the Fifteenth Amendment in an appropriate manner
with relation to the States”).
78 Govtrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-9 (last visited Nov.
7, 2011).
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to make it easier for jurisdictions” to get bailout coverage when it
passed the 2006 extension.79
2. Background of NAMUDNO and the Decisions in the Lower Courts
Shortly after the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA, Northwest
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One (“District”) brought a
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.80
The District was created to deliver city services to residents in Travis
County, Texas, and had a board of five members who are elected to
staggered terms of four years.81 The District did not register voters; its
elections were run by Travis County for administrative reasons.82
Nevertheless, the District was subject to the preclearance requirement
of section 5 since it is located in Texas, even though there is no
evidence that it had ever discriminated on the basis of race.83 In its
lawsuit, the District sought to challenge the constitutionality of the
preclearance provision of section 5 or, in the alternative, to seek
bailout coverage as a “political subdivision” covered by section 4(a)
of the VRA.84 In a unanimous opinion written by Judge David Tatel,85
the three-judge district court panel rejected both of the District’s
arguments and granted the Attorney General’s motion for summary
judgment.86
The District conceded that it was not a “political subdivision” as
defined in section 14(c)(2)87 since it did not register its own voters,
but it argued that it qualified as a “political subdivision” in the
ordinary meaning of that term since it is an “undisputed subunit of
Texas.”88 To substantiate its argument, the District relied on United
States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama,89 in which
the Supreme Court held that “once a state has been designated for
coverage, section 5’s preclearance requirement applies to all political
units within it regardless of whether the units qualify as section
Hasen, supra note 2, at 197.
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 223 (D.D.C.
2008), rev’d and remanded by 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
81 Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2510 (2009).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 223.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 283.
87 Section 14(c)(2) defines “political subdivisions” to mean “any county or parish, except
that where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or parish,
then term shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.”
42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (2006).
88 NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 231.
89 435 U.S. 110 (1978).
79
80
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14(c)(2) political subdivisions.”90 The District contended that, when
Congress passed the 1982 amendments to the VRA to expand bailout
eligibility to political subdivisions within formally covered
jurisdictions under section 4(a), Congress had the Sheffield
interpretation in mind.91 Ultimately, the court rejected this argument
for a number of reasons, including that the District’s definition would
make the amended statute surplusage,92 and that Sheffield related to
section 5 preclearance rather than section 4(a) bailout.93
To resolve the question regarding the constitutionality of section 5,
the court had to determine whether to review the statute under the
rationality test of South Carolina v. Katzenbach94 or whether it should
apply the City of Boerne v. Flores congruence and proportionality
test, which is a much stricter standard.95 Under the Katzenbach’s
rationality test, because Congress has “full remedial powers to
effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination
in voting,”96 as long as Congress employs rational means to reach this
goal, its actions are constitutional.97 In contrast, under the City of
Boerne test, “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end.”98 Ultimately, the district court concluded that the
extension of the VRA was constitutional under both standards,99 even

90

Id. at 122; see also NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (citing Sheffield, 435 U.S. at

122).
NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
Id. (“Under the District’s interpretation, this language would be surplusage.”).
93 Id. at 234 (“As we explained above, Sheffield relates to section 5 preclearance, not
section 4(a) bailout.”).
94 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (holding that “Congress may use any rational means to
effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting”).
95 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (holding that “[t]here must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end”).
96 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326.
97 Id. at 324 (“As against the reserved power of the States, Congress may use any rational
means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”). The
rational basis test used in Katzenbach derives from the test set forth in McCullough v. Maryland,
which states: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819); see Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326 (quoting
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421).
98 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
99 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 279 (D.D.C.
2008), rev’d and remanded by 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (“[G]iven Congress’s broad authority to
fashion remedial measures to combat racial discrimination in voting, we decline to second-guess
its decision to renew coverage and bailout provisions upheld in Katzenbach and City of Rome
and discussed with approval in the City of Boerne cases.”).
91
92
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if the court thought that the Katzenbach test was the more appropriate
test for this case.100
In the wake of the district court’s opinion, “voting rights experts
believed that the statutory bailout argument had no chance when [the
district court’s decision] was appealed to the Supreme Court. Instead,
it seemed unavoidable that the Court would address the
constitutionality of the extension of section 5.”101
3. NAMUDNO and a Lack of Logic: The Avoidance Canon in
NAMUDNO
During oral argument, while the liberal members of the Court
focused on the District’s bailout argument, the conservative members
of the Court focused on the constitutionality of section 5.102 Justice
Kennedy’s questions about the scope of section 5’s coverage were
particularly extensive. He asked seventeen questions at oral argument,
most of which questioned Congress’s approach in renewing the
VRA.103 At one point, Justice Kennedy said, “[There] is a great
disparity in treatment, and the government of the United States is
saying that our states must be treated differently,” and emphasized
that “[the government has] a very substantial burden if [it is] going to
make that case.”104 Given the tone of the oral arguments, most Court
spectators thought that the Court, in a split decision, was going to
strike down section 5.105 Many were surprised, therefore, when the
Court invoked the avoidance canon as an alternative to deciding the

100 See id. at 241–46 (discussing why the Katzenbach test is more appropriate for the case
than the City of Boerne test).
101 Hasen, supra note 2, at 201–02.
102 Id. at 202 (footnote omitted) (“At oral argument, Justice Souter pushed the bailout
argument, but the conservative members of the Court, led by the Chief Justice, focused instead
on the constitutional questions and severely criticized section 5.”).
103 Adam Liptak, Skepticism at Court on Validity of Vote Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009,
at A16 (“Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, whose vote is likely to be crucial, was a vigorous
participant in the argument, asking 17 questions that were almost consistently hostile to the
approach Congress had taken to renewing the act in 2006.”).
104 Transcript of Oral Argument at 34–35, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder,
129
S.
Ct.
2504
(2009)
(No.
08–322),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-322.pdf.
105 See Liptak, supra note 103 (noting that section 5 “[was] at substantial risk of being
struck down as unconstitutional”); Dahlia Lithwick, Spoonfuls of Sugar: Americans’ Continued
Love Affair with the John Roberts Court, SLATE (Sept. 26, 2009),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/09/spoonfuls_of_sugar.ht
ml (noting that most people “widely expected” a decision striking down section 5 of the VRA).
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constitutionality of section 5.106 Justice Thomas was the lone
dissenter.107
Chief Justice Roberts, who wrote the Court’s opinion, opened the
discussion by stating that the Court’s “usual practice is to avoid the
unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions”108 and that “[i]t is
a well-established principle governing the prudent exercise of this
Court’s jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a
constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to
dispose of the case.”109 Even though the Court made it clear that it
was invoking the avoidance canon, it still proceeded to raise doubts
about the constitutionality of section 5.
Chief Justice Roberts laid out his concerns about section 5 of the
VRA in a very straightforward manner. While he noted the historic
context of the VRA and its accomplishments,110 he quickly voiced his
doubt, noting that the conditions under which the statute passed “have
unquestionably improved” and that “[t]hings have changed in the
South.”111 He also raised federalism concerns about the statute and
reminded the parties that section 5, “which authorizes federal
intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking, imposes
substantial ‘federalism costs,’”112 and that “[t]hese federalism costs
have caused Members of [the] Court to express serious misgivings
about the constitutionality of [section] 5.”113 In fact, in his dissent,
Justice Thomas cited some of these same concerns as reasons why
section 5 is unconstitutional.114 Even though Chief Justice Roberts
stated his concerns about section 5, he invoked the avoidance doctrine
and decided the case on narrower statutory grounds.
In deciding NAMUDNO, the Court did not address the district
court’s constitutional analysis of section 5. The Court, however,
106 Hasen, supra note 2, at 203 (“In a surprising and relatively short opinion, however, the
Court on an 8–1 vote decided NAMUDNO on statutory grounds, ruling that the utility district
was entitled to bail out.”).
107 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2517 (2009) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 2508 (majority opinion).
109 Id. at 2513 (quoting Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per
curiam)).
110 Id. at 2511 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966)) (“The
historic accomplishments of the Voting Rights Act are undeniable. When it was first passed,
unconstitutional discrimination was rampant and the ‘registration of voting-age whites ran
roughly 50 percentage points or more ahead’ of black registration in many covered States.”).
111 Id.
112 Id. (quoting Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)).
113 Id. (citations omitted).
114 See id. at 2525 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The lack of sufficient evidence that the
covered jurisdictions currently engage in the type of discrimination that underlay the enactment
of [section] 5 undermines any basis for retaining it.”).
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reversed the district court’s decision that the District did not qualify
for bailout because section 14(c)(2)’s definition of “political
subdivision” applied to section 4(a) and the District did not qualify
under this narrow definition. Instead, the Court held that “the [VRA]
permits all political subdivisions, including the district in this case, to
seek relief from its preclearance requirements.”115 However, even
though the Court went through “a superficial textual analysis of the
bailout question,” it did not discuss the statutory analysis of the
district court.116 Rather, the Court opened its discussion of the bailout
provision by conceding that “[t]here is no dispute that the district is a
political subdivision of the State of Texas in the ordinary sense of the
term”117 and adding that, in this case, “specific precedent, the
structure of the [VRA], and the underlying constitutional concerns
compel a broader reading of the bailout provision.”118
Ultimately, the Court relied on Sheffield119 and Dougherty County
Board of Education v. White120 to support its decision that section
14(c)(2)’s definition of “political subdivision” did not cover the
meaning of the “political subdivision” in section 4(a). In Sheffield, the
Court noted that the definition of “political subdivision” under section
14(c)(2) “was intended to operate only for purposes of determining
which political unit in nondesignated States [could] be separately
designated for coverage under [section] 4(b).”121 Additionally, in
White, where a school board tried to argue that it did not fall within
the purview of section 5 because it did not meet the definition of a
“political subdivision” in section 14(c)(2), the Court noted that “once
a State has been designated for coverage, [section] 14(c)(2)’s
definition of political subdivision has no ‘operative significance in
determining the reach of [section] 5.’”122 Ultimately, these two cases
supported the Court’s conclusion that section 14(c)(2)’s definition of
“political subdivision” did not affect the District’s ability to seek a
bailout under section 4(a).123
To further advance its position, the Court referred to Congress’s
1982 amendments to the VRA, which “expressly provide[d] that
115 Id.

at 2516–17 (majority opinion).
supra note 2, at 204.
117 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2513.
118 Id. at 2514.
119 435 U.S. 110 (1978). See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion about the dicta in Sheffield.
120 439 U.S. 32, 46 (1978) (holding that a county school board is a political subdivision
within the purview of the Voting Rights Act when it “clearly has the power to affect candidate
participation in . . . elections,” because to hold otherwise in such a situation “would serve no
purpose consonant with the objectives of the federal statutory scheme”).
121 Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 128–29.
122 White, 439 U.S. at 44 (quoting Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 126).
123 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2516–17.
116 Hasen,
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bailout was also available to ‘political subdivisions’ in a covered
State . . . .”124 This meant that “Congress decided that a jurisdiction
covered because it was within a covered State need not remain
covered as long as the State did.”125 This interpretation of the 1982
amendments opened the door for the Court to hold that all political
subdivisions subject to section 5’s preclearance requirements, and not
just those covered by the definition of “political subdivision” in
section 14(c)(2), were eligible to file a bailout suit under section
4(a).126
4. The Effect of Implausible Statutory Interpretations on the
Avoidance Canon
The statutory analysis in NAMUDNO has struck many as
counterintuitive and illogical. Indeed, Hasen described the Court’s
construction of the statute as “an implausible reading . . . that
appeared contrary to textual analysis, congressional intent, and
administrative interpretation.”127 Another commentator noted that the
real story from NAMUDNO is “how [the Court] strained the text of
the statute and the intent of Congress in order to reach its desired
conclusion.”128 These criticisms of the Court’s opinion in NAMUDNO
bring to light the problems with the Court’s logic and illustrate the
negative impact this decision had on the Court and on the canon.
It is possible that, given the politically charged nature of the VRA,
the Court was not ready to, or did not have the votes to, strike down
section 5. By avoiding the issue, however, it still was able to engage
in a discussion with Congress and the public in general about the
problems it perceived with the VRA.129 This is not the problem with
the Court’s opinion. The problem is that the statutory argument in
NAMUDNO was so poorly reasoned that it seemed as though Court
was trying to figure out a way in which the District could get a bailout
without deciding the constitutionality of section 5 and without having
to face the political uproar that would inevitably ensue if it struck
down the statute. While the canon can help the Court to avoid “a
fullblown constitutional pronouncement that would harm its
legitimacy” and to “soften public and Congressional resistance to the
124 Id.

at 2515.

125 Id.
126 Id.

at 2516.
supra note 2, at 182–83.
128 Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Understanding the Paradoxical Case of the Voting Rights Act,
36 FLA. ST. U. L. R EV. 697, 746 (2009).
129 See Murchison, supra note 21, at 113 (noting that the avoidance canon can facilitate
“judicial conversation” about problems the judges encounter in their decisions).
127 Hasen,
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Court’s movement of the law in a direction that the Court prefers as a
matter of policy,” the canon does not, and should not, give the Court
latitude to adopt an unreasonable or implausible statutory
interpretation.130
When the Court adopts an implausible statutory interpretation, as it
did NAMUDNO, it may create future problems, as it invites further
litigation and significantly complicates the Court’s jurisprudence on
the issue. Unsound reasoning and flawed logic can also hurt the
Court’s legitimacy as it is much less persuasive and it raises questions
about the lengths the Court is willing to go to create a consensus or to
reach its desired outcome. If the Court does wish to use avoidance, it
should not sacrifice good judgment and well-reasoned decisions.
The Court’s flawed reasoning in NAMUDNO also hurts the
avoidance canon because it stretches the canon beyond its scope as “a
tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a
statutory text.”131 Accepting the common criticism that the Court’s
statutory interpretation was not plausible,132 the Court appears to have
stretched the boundaries of the doctrine. If there is no plausible
statutory interpretation, rather than manufacturing an implausible
interpretation, the Court should decide the constitutional question at
issue. The Court should not lean on the avoidance canon to give its
opinion a façade of reasonableness and legitimacy when it is actually
violating one of the important principles of the canon.
B. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
1. Background on the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and
the Court’s Decisions Leading up to Citizens United
Congress has been concerned about regulating who may fund
political campaign ads for a long time. In 1974, Congress passed
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), which
barred corporations and unions from spending money on certain
election activities, but still allowed them to set up political
committees to finance campaigns.133 During the 1990s, however,
people began to question the effectiveness of FECA because of a
corporation’s ability to evade the statute by producing advertisements
that seemed to influence federal elections, but that avoided words that

130 Hasen,

supra note 2, at 183–84.
v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005).
132 See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
133 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–443, 88 Stat.
1263 (1974).
131 Clark
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would constitute “express advocacy.”134 Due in part to these abuses,
section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(“BCRA”) created a category of “electioneering communications”
and provided that any corporation that spent money to create these
communications had to disclose who funded the projects.135 The
BCRA defined an electioneering communication as “any broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified
candidate for Federal office” and is aired within thirty days of a
primary election or sixty days of a general election.136
Multiple plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of FECA,
the BCRA, and other similar state statutes. Prior to Citizens United,
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce137 was the leading case
about the constitutionality of a statute that limited a corporation’s
ability to spend money in an election. The statute at issue in Austin
was a Michigan statute that “prohibit[ed] corporations from making
contributions and independent expenditures in connection with state
candidate elections.”138 In a 6-3 decision,139 the Court held that the
statute’s limits on corporate spending on “express advocacy” did not
violate the First Amendment because the statute was supported by the
compelling government interest of preventing political corruption and
the statute was narrowly tailored to that purpose.140
While Austin dealt with a state statute, it affected the Court’s
subsequent decisions involving federal restraints on corporate
spending in political campaigns. In McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission,141 the plaintiffs challenged section 203 of the BCRA. In
its decision, the Court relied on Austin to uphold the constitutionality
of restrictions on corporate spending in federal elections. The Court
reiterated that it has “repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at ‘the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s
political ideas’”142 and that Congress could limit the advertisements at
issue since they were “the functional equivalent of express
134 Hasen,

supra note 2, at 207.
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81, 91

135 Bipartisan

(2002).
136 2

U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006).
U.S. 652 (1990).
138 Id. at 655.
139 Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justices Scalia, Kennedy and
O’Connor dissented. Id. at 654.
140 Id. at 659–61.
141 540 U.S. 93, 102 (2003).
142 Id. at 205 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).
137 494
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advocacy.”143 While the Court took consistent approaches in
McConnell and Austin, its decision in Wisconsin Right to Life v.
Federal Election Commission144 signaled that trouble loomed ahead
for limitations on corporate independent expenditures for
electioneering communications.
In Wisconsin Right to Life, the Court faced yet another challenge
to section 203 of the BCRA. The case involved a corporate-funded
broadcast advertisement that mentioned Senators Feingold and Kohl’s
positions on judicial filibusters, which was to be aired shortly before
the primary elections.145 In a 5-4 decision, the Court noted that the
First Amendment required it “to err on the side of protecting political
speech rather than suppressing it” and held that section 203 was
unconstitutional as applied to the ads in the case since the
advertisements at issue were not the “functional equivalent” of
express campaign speech.146 This decision marked a shift in the
Court’s approach to the BCRA, and shortly after the decision Citizens
United provided the Court with another opportunity to consider the
constitutionality of the BCRA.
2. The Origin of Citizens United and its Path to the Supreme Court
In 2008, Citizens United, “a nonprofit ideological corporation (but
one that took some for-profit corporate funding),” produced a
documentary called Hillary: The Movie.147 The documentary
mentioned then-Senator Hillary Clinton by name and included
interviews with people who were critical of her.148 While the
documentary did come out in theaters, the trouble started when
Citizens United wanted to broadcast the documentary on cable
television through a video-on-demand service within thirty days of
the 2008 primary elections.149 Citizens United, however, “feared . . .
that both the film and the ads would be covered by [section 203’s]
ban on corporate-funded independent expenditures, thus subjecting
the corporation to civil and criminal penalties.”150 Accordingly,
Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Federal Election Commission (“FEC”), arguing that certain

143 Id.

at 206.
U.S. 449 (2007)
145 Id. at 458–59.
146 Id. at 457.
147 Hasen, supra note 2, at 210.
148 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010).
149 Id. at 888.
150 Id.
144 551
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provisions of the BCRA were unconstitutional, including section 203,
as applied to its documentary.151
The three-judge court in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia denied Citizens United’s motion for a
preliminary injunction and granted the FEC’s motion for summary
judgment.152 The court held that section 203 was both facially
constitutional under McConnell and constitutional as applied to
Hillary.153 In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that the
content of Hillary was “susceptible of no other interpretation than to
inform the electorate that Senator Clinton is unfit for office, that the
United States would be a dangerous place in a President Hillary
Clinton world, and that viewers should vote against her.”154
3. Re-Argument and the Majority’s Reasoning: The Overruling of
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce and McConnell v.
Federal Election Commission
Citizens United appealed the district court’s decisions and, in
March 2009, argued its case before the Supreme Court. However, the
Court announced it would rehear the case in September 2009 and
asked for supplemental briefing on the facial validity of section 203
and on whether the Court should overrule either Austin, McConnell,
or both.155 Just over four months later, “a bitterly divided”156 Court
announced, in a sweeping 5-4 decision, that section 203’s restrictions
on corporate independent expenditures were unconstitutional and
overruled Austin and McConnell.157
Before Justice Kennedy, who wrote for the majority, reached the
question of the constitutionality of section 203 and the validity of
Austin and McConnell, he took time to explain why the Court could
not decide the case on narrower statutory grounds. The Court rejected
Citizens United’s argument that Hillary did not fall under the
definition of an electioneering communication since the documentary
would most likely be seen only by one household and not more than
151 Id.
152 Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d and remanded
by 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
153 Id. at 280.
154 Id. at 279.
155 Hasen, supra note 2, at 212.
156 Adam Liptak, Justices, 5–4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2010, at A1. Citizens United also challenged the BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure
requirements as applied to Hillary and to the ads for the movie. The Court held that the BCRA’s
disclaimer and disclosure requirements still applied to ads and the documentary as “there [had]
been no showing that, as applied in this case, [those] requirements would impose a chill on
speech of expression.” Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).
157 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
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50,000 people as the statute required.158 To the contrary, the Court
found that the number of viewers the statute requires is determined by
the number of cable subscribers in the pertinent area, which in this
case well exceeded the 50,000-person requirement.159 The Court also
rejected Citizens United’s argument that section 203 did not apply to
Hillary under Wisconsin Right to Life, because “there [was] no
reasonable interpretation of Hillary other than as an appeal to vote
against Senator Clinton” and, therefore, the documentary qualified
“as the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”160 Citizens United
argued, thirdly, that the statute should not apply to movies broadcast
through video-on-demand since “this delivery system has a lower risk
of distorting the political process than do television ads.”161 This
argument did not persuade the Court as it noted that “any effort by the
Judiciary to decide which means of communications are to be
preferred . . . would raise questions as to the court’s own lawful
authority.”162 Finally, the Court refused to carve out an exception for
nonprofit corporate political speech funded “overwhelmingly by
individuals” since it would require an in-depth, “case-by-case
determination[] to verify whether political speech is banned.”163
After rejecting Citizens United’s statutory arguments, the Court
explained that it could not “resolve this case on a narrower ground
without chilling political speech . . . that is central to the meaning and
purpose of the First Amendment.”164 Accordingly, the Court felt that
it had to reconsider the Court’s decisions in Austin and McConnell
and the constitutionality of section 203’s expenditure ban.165 The
Court premised this bold decision to revisit precedent and decide the
constitutionality of the statute at issue by emphasizing that “[i]t is not
judicial restraint to accept an unsound, narrow argument just so the
Court can avoid another argument with broader implications.”166 And,
with that, the same Court that seemed so reluctant to address the
constitutionality of section 5 of the VRA in NAMUDNO and that
enthusiastically endorsed the avoidance canon, proceeded to ignore
the avoidance canon and to rewrite the Court’s approach to corporate
campaign spending.

158 Id.

at 888–89.
at 889.
160 Id. at 890.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 891–92.
164 Id. at 892.
165 Id. at 893–94.
166 Id. at 892.
159 Id.
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The Court first considered the validity of Austin and noted two
conflicting lines of precedent. One of these lines, which includes
cases such as Buckley v. Valeo167 and First National Bank v.
Bellotti,168 “forbid[s] restrictions on political speech based on the
speaker’s corporate identity”; in contrast, the Austin line of cases
permits these types of restrictions.169 Ultimately, the Court decided
that the Buckley and Bellotti line of cases adopted the correct
approach to the First Amendment and overruled Austin, noting that
“[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political
speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”170 The Court did not
stop after overruling Austin; it proceeded to overrule the section of
McConnell that upheld section 203 because the McConnell Court
relied on Austin “to uphold a greater restriction on speech than the
restriction upheld in Austin.”171
4. Dueling Opinions: Justice Roberts’s Concurrence and Justice
Stevens’s Dissent
All opinions have weaknesses, including the Court’s opinion in
Citizens United, but Justice Stevens’s dissent and Chief Justice
Roberts’s concurrence exacerbated the opinion’s flaws. While Justice
Stevens disagreed with the majority’s approach on a number of
grounds, one of his major contentions was the Court’s disregard for
the avoidance canon. He outlined various approaches the Court could
have taken, such as deciding the case on narrow statutory grounds and
holding that a documentary shown through video-on-demand did not
qualify as an “electioneering communication” under the BCRA.172 In
Justice Stevens’s mind, by bypassing these narrower grounds, the
Court transgressed a ‘“cardinal’ principle of the judicial process: ‘[I]f
it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide

167 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (striking down the expenditure ban in the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, which applied to corporations and unions).
168 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (holding that there is “no support in the First Amendment, or
in the decisions of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the
protection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is a
corporation”).
169 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (noting that, whereas the “pre-Austin line [of cases]
forb[ade] restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s identity,” the “post-Austin line
permit[ed] them”).
170 Id. at 913.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 937 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 937–38 (describing three narrower
approaches the majority could have adopted in Citizens United and noting that the “brief tour of
alternative grounds . . . is meant to show that there were principled, narrower paths that a Court
that was serious about judicial restraint could have taken”).
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more.”173 He also emphasized “[t]he elementary rule . . . that every
reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute
from unconstitutionality.”174 Although he did not use Ashwander’s
standard citation to the avoidance canon or invoke the canon by
name, his dissent strongly alluded to the canon and implied that the
majority’s sole reason for not employing the canon was that “five
Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before [the
Court], so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to
change the law.”175
Many commentators believe that the critical tone Justice Stevens’s
dissent prompted Chief Justice Roberts to write a concurring
opinion.176 Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence vigorously defended
the majority’s opinion and attempted to combat Justice Stevens’s
accusations of judicial activism.177 He reaffirmed the Court’s
commitment to the avoidance canon178 and emphasized its willingness
to invoke the canon when appropriate by citing its decision in
NAMUDNO.179 Chief Justice Roberts noted, however, that the Court’s
approach in Citizens United was consistent with the avoidance canon
as it addressed the statutory arguments first and did not move on to
the constitutional arguments until it addressed, and rejected, Citizens
United’s statutory claim that section 203 did not apply to Hillary.180
Although the Court decided the constitutionality of the statute, it did
so because the Court should not let the “practice of avoiding
unnecessary (and unnecessarily broad) constitutional holdings . . .
trump[] [its] obligation faithfully to interpret the law” and because it
173 Id. at 937 (quoting PDK Labs., Inc. v. United States, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
174 Id. (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
175 Id. at 932.
176 See Adam Liptak, Justices Turn Minor Movie Case Into a Blockbuster, N.Y. T IMES ,
Jan. 23, 2010, at A13 (noting that “[t]he chief justice’s decision to respond separately indicated
that ‘he felt the sting of Stevens’s dissent”’); Richard Hasen, Chief Justice Roberts’ Concurring
Opinion in Citizens United: Two Mysteries, E LECTION LAW B LOG (Jan. 23, 2010),
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/015118.html (suggesting that Chief Justice Roberts “felt
compelled to write once he saw the Justice Stevens dissent”).
177 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917 (Roberts, J., concurring) (“I write separately to
address the important principles of judicial restraint and stare decisis implicated in this case.”).
178 See id. at 918 (citations omitted) (“Because the stakes are so high, our standard practice
is to refrain from addressing constitutional questions except when necessary to rule on particular
claims before us. This policy underlies . . . our willingness to construe ambiguous statutes to
avoid constitutional problems . . . .”).
179 See id. (“If there were a valid basis for deciding the statutory claim in Citizens United’s
favor (and thereby avoiding constitutional adjudication), it would be proper to do so. In deed
that is precisely the approach the Court took just last Term in [NAMUDNO].”).
180 See id. (“It is only because the majority rejects Citizens United’s statutory claim that it
proceeds to consider the group’s various constitutional arguments . . . .”).

2/14/2012 5:00:34 PM

2012]

THE ROLE OF THE AVOIDANCE CANON

869

“cannot embrace a narrow ground of decision simply because it is
narrow; it must also be right.”181
5. The Court’s Flawed Approach to the Avoidance Canon in Citizens
United
There are two major flaws with the Court’s opinion and approach
to the avoidance canon in Citizens United. First, if the majority did
not adhere to the avoidance canon to promote a political agenda as
Justice Stevens suggested, then the Court’s failure to adhere to the
canon undermines its usefulness as a substantive canon. The Court
seemed to go out of its way to order re-argument and to dismiss
Citizens United’s statutory arguments so that it could decide the
constitutionality of section 203 and overrule Austin and McConnell.182
In the process of accomplishing this desired result, the Court
deliberately ignored the avoidance canon and crafted ways to dismiss
valid statutory arguments. The Court’s approach in Citizens United
undermined the essence of the avoidance canon since it failed to
adopt plausible statutory arguments. This type of manipulation and
inconsistent use of avoidance damages the utility and value of the
canon because it transforms the canon from a valid and important
presumption into a random citation void of any meaningful principle.
The second flaw with the Court’s approach is that, even if one
thinks that the majority’s decision was correct, and that the avoidance
canon was not applicable, the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Citizens United still negatively affected the value of the avoidance
canon and hurt the public’s perception of the Court. While dissenting
justices typically point out different arguments and address some of
their problems with the majority’s opinion, the tone of Justice
Stevens’s dissent in Citizens United was exceedingly harsh and
critical and questioned not only the majority’s reasoning, but its
motives and judicial philosophy as well. Chief Justice Roberts’s
concurring opinion likely did nothing to improve the public’s
perception of the Court, either, as his defensive concurrence further
highlighted the ideological divide between majority and dissenting
justices. While debate is healthy, excessive personal attacks against
other justices and the majority’s reasoning may create a public
perception that the Court is a fractured institution and may cause the
181 Id.

at 919.
id. at 938 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The only thing preventing the majority from
affirming the District Court, or adopting a narrower ground that would retain Austin, is its
disdain for Austin.”); id. at 941–42 (“In the end, the Court’s rejection of Austin and McConnell
comes down to nothing more than its disagreement with their results.”).
182 See
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public to question the validity of the Court’s decisions. This type of
infighting exposes the weaknesses of the avoidance canon. The
justices’ debate about the canon showed just how susceptible it is to
various interpretations. The debate also highlights that, like other
substantive canons, the avoidance canon can be easily manipulated as
its application is dependent on the justices’ judicial and political
views. By revealing the discretionary nature of the canon, the Court
diminishes its persuasiveness, and, as a consequence, decreases its
usefulness.
C. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board
1. A Look at the Court’s Removal Power Jurisprudence
Article II of the Constitution provides that “[t]he executive Power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”183 At
the time the first executive departments were created, the prevailing
view was that “the executive power included a power to oversee
executive officers through removal” since it was “a traditional
executive power” that was not expressly taken away from the
President.184 Nevertheless, Congress began to pass statutes that
limited the President’s power to remove various categories of
officers, and it was left up to the Court to decide which types of
limitations were permissible.
In the first major case regarding the removal of executive officers,
Myers v. United States,185 the Court contemplated the constitutionality
of a statute limiting the President’s power to remove a postmaster.
The Court struck down the statute, explaining that it was essential that
the President have the power to remove “those for whom he cannot
continue to be responsible.”186 As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent
in Free Enterprise Fund, the Myers decision “cast serious doubt on
the constitutionality of all ‘for cause’ removal provisions . . . .”187
Nine years after Myers, the Court decided Humphrey’s Executor v.
United States.188 In Humphrey’s Executor, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a statute providing that the President could only
183 U.S.

C ONST . art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3152 (2010).
185 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
186 Id. at 117.
187 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3183 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see infra Part II.C.4 for a
discussion of how the Myers decision can explain the absence of a “for cause” provision in the
statute creating the SEC.
188 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
184 Free
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remove members of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) during
their seven-year terms for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office.”189 Rather than gravitating towards its
reasoning in Myers, the Court in Humphrey’s Executor sought to
distinguish the facts at issue from those in Myers. The Court reasoned
that the FTC performed a “quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial”
function rather than the executive function that the postmaster served
in Myers; therefore, Congress could require it to act independently
from the executive branch.190 Given this distinction, the Court upheld
the removal provision, holding that Congress had the power to “fix
the period during which [the members of the FTC could] continue in
office, and to forbid their removal except for cause in the
meantime.”191
Decades after Humphrey’s Executor, the Court decided Morrison
v. Olson,192 which concerned the Ethics in Government Act.193 This
Act permitted a special court to appoint an independent counsel to
investigate and prosecute alleged federal criminal activities of high
executive officers.194 The independent counsel, however, could be
removed by the Attorney General only “for good cause.”195 In a 7-1
decision,196 the Court sustained the statute.197 In its opinion, the Court
noted that, because the Attorney General is under the direct control of
the President, “[t]his [was] not a case in which the power to remove
an executive official [had] been completely stripped from the
President . . . .”198 Additionally, because the independent counsel
could be terminated for cause, “the Executive, through the Attorney
General, retain[ed] ample authority to assure that the counsel [was]
competently performing his or her statutory responsibilities . . . .”199
While the Court did not address the validity of its decision in
Morrison or its other decisions involving the removal power in Free
Enterprise Fund because “[t]he parties [did] not ask [them] to
reexamine any of [those] precedents,” these decisions establish the
framework in which the Court was operating.200 Additionally, these
189 Id.
190 Id.

at 620 (internal quotation marks omitted).
at 629.

191 Id.
192 487

U.S. 654 (1988).
L. No. 95–521, 92 Stat. 1867 (1978) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 591 et. seq. (2006)).
194 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660 (citation omitted)..
195 Id. at 663 (citation omitted)..
196 Id. at 658.
197 Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which no other justices joined and Justice
Kennedy took no part in the decision. Id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198 Id. at 692 (majority opinion).
199 Id.
200 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010).
193 Pub.
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decisions may help to explain why the Court ignored the avoidance
canon and decided the constitutionality of the statute at issue.
2. The Creation and Function of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board
In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals,
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,201 which sought to
reform corporate America and its accounting practices.202 As part of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress created the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (“Board”) “to oversee the audit of public
companies that are subject to the securities laws, and related matters,
in order to protect the interests of investors and further the public
interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent
audit reports.”203 This broad grant of power enabled the Board to
“regulate every detail of an accounting firm’s practice, including
hiring and professional development, promotion, supervision of audit
work, the acceptance of new business and the continuation of old,
internal inspection procedures, [and] professional ethics rules . . . .”204
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) appoints the
five members of the Board for five-year terms “after consultation
with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
and the Secretary of the Treasury . . . ”; vacancies are filled by the
same process.205 When the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was adopted, the
Board members could be removed only by the SEC and only for good
cause: committing willful violations of the Act, abusing their
authority, or unreasonably failing to enforce compliance with rules or
professional standards.206 Furthermore, the SEC benefitted from farreaching oversight powers of the Board.207 However, this system of
for-cause removal changed with the Court’s decision in Free
Enterprise Fund.

201 Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28 and 29 U.S.C.).
202 See Floyd Norris & Adam Liptak, Court Backs Accounting Regulator, N.Y. T IMES ,
June 29, 2010, at B1 (noting that “the Sarbanes-Oxley Act . . . sought to reform corporate
America after the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals”).
203 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2006).
204 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148.
205 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(1), (e)(4)(A), (e)(5)(A).
206 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3).
207 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7217(b)(2) (“[n]o rule of the board shall become effective without
prior approval of the Commission . . . .”).
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3. The Origins of Free Enterprise Fund and the Decisions by the
Lower Courts
In 2004, the Board inspected Beckstead & Watts, LLP, a small
Nevada accounting firm. The Board decided that there were some
deficiencies with its auditing procedures and began a formal
investigation.208 Subsequently, Beckstead & Watts and Free
Enterprise Fund209 brought suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia arguing that the Board was
unconstitutional.210
The plaintiffs set forth two main arguments. First, they contended
that the Board’s structure violated the Appointments Clause, which
“empowers the President to appoint ‘Officers of the United States,’
while allowing Congress to vest the appointment of ‘inferior Officers’
in the President, Courts of Law, or Heads of Departments.”211 They
argued that the members of the Board were not inferior officers
because they were not supervised regularly by principal officers who
report directly to the President and, therefore, the members of the
Board had to be appointed by the President.212 In the alternative, the
plaintiffs alleged that, even if the members of the Board were inferior
officers, the SEC could not appoint them because it is not a
“Department,” and the appointment power had to be vested in the
SEC chair rather than the entire SEC.213 Second, the plaintiffs
asserted that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act “contravened the separation of
powers by conferring wide-ranging executive power on Board
members without subjecting them to Presidential control.”214 The
district court granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment, and,
in a 2-1 decision,215 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.216
The Court of Appeals focused on the structure of removal, as well
as that Board members could only be removed by the SEC for good
cause and that, in turn, the SEC’s Commissioners could only be
208 Free

Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3149.
Enterprise Fund is a nonprofit organization that supports economic growth and
limited government. Beckstead & Watts is a member of the Free Enterprise Fund. Leading
Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 179, 290 (2010).
210 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Civil Action No. 06–0217
(JR), 2007 WL 891675, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007), aff’d, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
211 Id. at *4 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3149 (2010).
215 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 668 (D.C. Cir.
2008) aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
216 Id. at 685.
209 Free
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removed by the President for good cause.217 It stated that this “double
for-cause limitation on removal” was “a question of first impression”
since neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court had
“considered a situation where a restriction on removal pass[ed]
through two levels of control.”218 Ultimately, however, the court held
that, despite the double for-cause limitation, the removal structure
“[did] not strip the President of sufficient power to influence the
Board and thus [did] not contravene separation of powers. . . .”219
While the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court in a 5-4
decision,220 it did utilize the Court of Appeals’ focus on double forcause limitation on removal as grounds for distinguishing Free
Enterprise Fund from existing precedent and as a means to strike
down the removal provision in the statute.
4. The Court’s Decision and the Debate Surrounding the Avoidance
Canon in Free Enterprise Fund
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, opened his opinion
with a brief overview of Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, and Morrison,
but quickly distinguished these cases from the fact pattern in Free
Enterprise Fund. Roberts adopted the appellate court’s determination
that this situation was one of first impression for the Court as it
involved a removal restriction that passed through two levels of
control whereas the Court’s previous decisions involved a removal
restriction with only one level of control.221 For the Court, this “added
layer of tenure protection [made] a difference.”222 Ultimately, because
the Act “subvert[ed] the President’s ability to ensure that the laws
[were] faithfully executed,”223 the Court held that this dual for-cause
limitation structure was “contrary to Article II’s vesting of the
executive power in the President”224 and “contraven[ed] the
Constitution’s separation of powers.”225 The details of the Court’s
217 Id.

at 668–69.
at 679.
219 Id. at 669.
220 Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined the opinion of the Court.
Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor
joined. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146.
221 See id. at 3147 (“We are asked . . . to consider a new situation not yet encountered by
the Court. The question is whether these separate layers of protection may be combined.”); id. at
3153 (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 679) (“Morrison did not . . . address the
consequences of more than one level of good-cause tenure-leaving the issue, as both the court
and dissent below recognized, a ‘question of first impression’ in this Court.”).
222 Id. at 3153.
223 Id. at 3155.
224 Id. at 3147.
225 Id. at 3151.
218 Id.
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analysis are irrelevant for the purposes of an analysis of the avoidance
canon, as Chief Justice Roberts did not mention the avoidance canon
in his opinion. Justice Breyer’s dissent, however, briefly alluded to
the role that avoidance could have played in the Court’s decision.
While Justice Breyer’s dissent focused on the various problems he
perceived in the majority’s opinion,226 he questioned how the Court
could “simply assume” that the SEC Commissioners were removable
only for cause.227 The majority assumed that SEC Commissioners
could only be removed for cause because the statute establishing the
SEC is completely silent on the question of removal.228 Justice Breyer
noted that the statute’s silence on removal was intentional as
Congress created the SEC in the nine-year period between Myers and
Humphrey’s Executor, when there was “doubt on the constitutionality
of all ‘for cause’ removal provisions” and “at a time when, under
[the] Court’s precedents, it would have been unconstitutional to make
the Commissioners removable only for cause.”229 Ultimately, Justice
Breyer concluded that the majority read a for-cause removal
requirement into the statute “to strike down, not to uphold, another
statute,”230 which “is not a statutory construction that seeks to avoid a
constitutional question, but its opposite.”231 Although Justice Breyer’s
reference to the avoidance canon is brief, it raises questions about
why the Court read a for-cause requirement into the statute and
determined the constitutionality of the statute at issue, rather than
invoking the avoidance canon.
5. The Function and Influence of Constitutional Avoidance in Free
Enterprise Fund
The operation, and influence, of the avoidance canon in Free
Enterprise Fund is not as obvious as in other cases since the Court
appears to have not adhered to the canon to avoid overruling
precedent. Since Morrison, the composition of the Court has changed
dramatically. Only Justices Kennedy and Scalia were members of the
226 See id. at 3170 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court “should decide the
constitutional question in light of the provision’s practical functioning in context”); see also id.
at 3171 (emphasis in original) (arguing that “the Court fails to show why two layers of ‘for
cause’ protection – Layer One insulating the commissioners from the President, and Layer Two
insulating the Board from the Commissioners—impose any more serious limitation upon the
President’s power than one layer”).
227 Id. at 3182 (emphasis in original).
228 Id. at 3182–83.
229 Id. at 3183 (emphasis in original).
230 Id. at 3184.
231 Id. (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979)).
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Morrison Court; Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision232 and
Justice Scalia wrote the dissenting opinion.233 It seems as though the
Court’s ideology about the separation of powers and the scope of
executive power has changed since Morrison. Perhaps the key to why
the Court framed the issue in Free Enterprise Fund as one involving
two levels of for-cause removal was because the majority wanted to
strike down the statute and to expand the executive branch’s power,
but also wanted to avoid overruling Morrison. Without the presence
of two levels of for-cause removal, the facts in Free Enterprise Fund
closely resembled those of Morrison. Therefore, when the court of
appeals framed the removal provision in Free Enterprise Fund as
having two levels of for-cause removal, the majority latched onto that
idea as a way of distinguishing the case before them from the
Morrison line of cases. This enabled the majority to achieve its goal
of striking down the statute while avoiding conflict with existing
precedent.234
Justice Breyer’s dissent drew attention to the Court’s questionable
decision to read a for-cause removal requirement into the statute
creating the SEC and its unwillingness to employ the avoidance
doctrine.235 Justice Breyer has the right to raise his concerns and his
viewpoint is persuasive, but his opinion is yet another example of a
dissenting Justice highlighting the avoidance canon to further his or
her own position and to criticize the majority. This sort of criticism
underscores the discretionary nature of the canon. While it is widely
understood that the canon is a persuasive rather than mandatory
principle, drawing excessive attention to this fact diminishes the
public’s perception of the validity of the canon and the persuasiveness
of the Court’s future citations to it.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Court’s opinion was the
majority’s decision to read a for-cause removal requirement into the
statute creating the SEC. The Court adopted an arguably incorrect
statutory interpretation that ignored the plain language of the statute
and Congress’s intent to strike down this statute. If the principles
232 Morrison

v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 658 (1988).
at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234 Even though the Court did not adhere to the avoidance canon in this case or in Citizens
United, the Court’s approach in the two cases seems to conflict since one avoided overruling
precedent and the other did not. Maybe one explanation for the difference in these approaches is
that in Citizens United, it is likely that if the Court did not strike down the statute or overrule
Austin or McConnell that another plaintiff would have filed a suit. In contrast, Free Enterprise
Fund covers a more limited set of circumstances that cannot be challenged as easily.
235 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3184
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for reading the “for cause” requirement
into the statute “that does not appear in the relevant statute and which Congress probably did not
intend to write”).
233 Id.
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behind the avoidance canon do not support a court’s decision to adopt
an implausible statutory interpretation to uphold a statute, then the
Court’s use of an implausible statutory interpretation to strike down a
statute is even more troubling. The Court basically chose not to
adhere to the avoidance canon to disregard the intent of one branch of
government and to give another branch more power. This decision
certainly undermines the Roberts Court’s minimalist reputation and
raises serious concerns about the authority of the majority’s reasoning
and the justices’ desire to push a particular agenda.
III. THE BIG PICTURE: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF NAMUDNO,
CITIZENS UNITED, AND FREE ENTERPRISE FUND ON THE AVOIDANCE
CANON AND ON THE COURT ITSELF
The Roberts Court’s use of the avoidance canon has been anything
but consistent. In practical terms, the outcomes of the cases and the
reasons that the Court applied the avoidance canon inconsistently may
be a result of what was at issue in each case. While NAMUDNO dealt
with the controversial issue of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
neither Citizens United nor Free Enterprise Fund dealt with similar
controversial issues. Given the less controversial nature of these
cases, perhaps the conservative members of the Court felt more
comfortable pushing the envelope and refusing to adhere to the
avoidance canon to accomplish its ideological goals. Or, maybe
Citizens United and Free Enterprise Fund turned out differently
because in those cases Justice Kennedy, the Court’s current swing
vote, was willing to vote with the conservative members of the Court,
whereas he was reluctant to do so in NAMUDNO. Regardless of the
reasons these cases turned out differently, the Court’s disparate
approaches to the avoidance canon in each case, the way in which the
justices wrote the opinions, and the increasingly flawed reasoning of
these decisions have broad implications for the canon, its future
legitimacy, and the public’s perception of the Court.
The Court’s differing approaches to constitutional avoidance in
NAMUDNO, Citizens United, and Free Enterprise Fund reveal the
threat not only to the legitimacy of the avoidance canon, but also to
the reputation of the Court. While the Court claimed that
constitutional avoidance was its “usual practice” in NAMUDNO,236 it
proceeded to give a cursory treatment to the canon in Citizens United
and Free Enterprise Fund. The Court seems to vigorously defend and
support the canon one minute, but gives superficial reasons for not
236 Nw.

Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508 (2009).
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applying the canon in a specific case, or ignores the canon altogether
the next minute. Chief Justice Roberts claims that the members of the
Court are united in their allegiance to the avoidance canon,237 but
Citizens United and Free Enterprise Fund suggest otherwise. The
mixed messages these decisions send about the canon cause it to
suffer because it conveys the perception that the justices’ personal
ideologies are driving the decisions rather than the facts of a given
case. These contradictory statements about, and approaches to, the
canon cannot continue if the Court wants to preserve the canon’s
legitimacy. While the canon may be discretionary, it cannot continue
to be meaningful and persuasive if the justices constantly change the
way in which it applies, or if they deliberately ignore it to promote
their own agendas. Additionally, if the justices continue to use flawed
reasoning and fail to adhere to the avoidance canon to promote a
political agenda, the Roberts Court will lose its reputation as a
minimalist court, if it has not done so already.
CONCLUSION
Although the decisions in NAMUDNO, Citizens United, and Free
Enterprise Fund each address the avoidance canon in different
contexts and each damages the canon in a distinct way, when these
decisions are read together it is apparent that the Court is bringing
constitutional avoidance back into the spotlight and is pushing the
outer limits of the canon. The Court’s treatment of the canon in these
opinions has diminished the canon’s persuasiveness and has damaged
the legitimacy of the Court. The Justices, therefore, should evaluate
whether they value the canon, reconsider the canon’s role in the
Court’s jurisprudence, and think about the message that the Court
sends when it employs the avoidance canon in inconsistent and
implausible ways. If the Court values the avoidance canon and its
own minimalist reputation, it should proceed with caution the next
time it invokes or ignores the doctrine.
MOLLY MCQUILLEN†

237 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 918 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(noting that, when stakes in a particular case are high, the Court’s “standard practice is to refrain
from addressing constitutional questions except when necessary to rule on particular
claims . . . ”).
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